The UPA’s real growth story

The UPA’s real growth story

Rajeev Gouda

That black money induced rising asset prices leading to jobless GDP growth is a phantom argument.

Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh penned a poignant article (“Making of a mammoth tragedy”, The Hindu, December 9) warning us of the impending pitfalls of the demonetisation exercise. In a response, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) ideologue S. Gurumurthy wrote about the economic performance of the National Democratic Alliance government (1999-2004) and the United Progressive Alliance-1 government (2004 to 2009), sidestepping the entire issue of economic and social costs of demonetisation or its benefits, if any (“Not a tragedy but the remedy”, December 13).

All about a decade

Mr. Gurumurthy’s argument goes like this: GDP grew rapidly from 2004 to 2009. Asset prices (stock markets, gold, real estate) also grew rapidly during this period as did the share of high denomination currency notes in circulation. He then uses a misleading number for jobs generated in this period to make the point that GDP growth in this period was “fake” growth. He then argues that huge amounts of ‘black cash’ led to asset price inflation which led to high GDP growth. This bizarre argument then goes on to justify how invalidating high denomination currency notes overnight was the remedy for this surfeit of “black cash”. Mr. Gurumurthy misdiagnoses a non-existent problem for which apparently the demonetisation initiative is a remedy.

India’s GDP growth was indeed 50 per cent higher in 2004 to 2009 (UPA-1) vis-à-vis 1999 to 2004 (NDA-1). Asset prices also rose sharply between 2004 and 2009. These are valid, independent observations in themselves and are natural correlates in most economies. This does not imply that rising asset prices were the reason for high GDP growth — correlation is not causation. Further, hard data refute the allegation that it was merely wealth effects of asset price inflation that drove GDP growth during UPA-1. India manufactured 5.5 crore new automobiles in this period compared to 2.8 crore in 1999-2004. India produced 257 million tonnes of steel versus 159 million tonnes during the tenure of NDA-1; 260 million sq. m of textile were manufactured during UPA-1 versus just 204 million sq. m during NDA-1. All these are real economic outputs that add up to GDP growth. Almost every output indicator — foodgrains, fertiliser, electricity, cement, crude oil — grew 1.5-2 times during UPA-1. All this output did not come out of thin air but out of real economic activity.

Stock prices rose sharply in this period. But that was because revenues and earnings of companies also grew significantly. Turnover of the BSE 500 companies grew 15 per cent annually during NDA-1. It grew 22 per cent during UPA-1. Profits of these companies grew 24 per cent during NDA-1 while they grew 28 per cent during UPA-1 despite the global economic crisis of 2008. Stock markets will naturally rise to reflect these increased earnings. Propelled by strong GDP growth, households became richer and bought twice as much gold during UPA-1 as during NDA-1. It is thus not a surprise that gold prices also rose rapidly. These data amply prove that the assertion that GDP growth during UPA-1 was driven only by asset price inflation is wild and baseless.

Contrary to Mr. Gurumurthy’s claims, robust economic activity during 2004-2009 also resulted in significant job creation in the organised sector. His claim that 60 million jobs were generated during NDA-1 but only 2.7 million during UPA-1 is misleading. The 60 million figure is based on the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) data where some sample households are asked if they are employed or not. Notice there is a subtle but important difference in terminology used by the NSSO surveys and Mr. Gurumurthy’s position — employment versus jobs. According to the NSSO survey, there was an increase in employment of 60 million people during NDA-1. It turns out that a significant part of this increase was actually people claiming to be employed in agriculture. Now, that is not the same as “generating new jobs”, is it?

When we say jobs, we usually mean a salary-paying formal or informal sector job, not self-employment in agriculture. The same NSSO survey report also shows a decline (yes, not increase) of 1.7 million people in organised public and private sectors during NDA-1. In other words, there were net reductions in organised sector employment, that is, jobs. This inconvenient statistic does not find a mention in Mr. Gurumurthy’s article. The NSSO survey data also show how during 2004-10, there was a net increase of 2.3 million people in organised sector jobs, implying UPA-1 created more “jobs” than NDA-1. If one needs to look at empirical data for jobs numbers, one indicator is provident fund (PF) registrations. Most permanent salary-paying jobs in the formal sector entail PF payments to employees. The UPA-1 period had an increase of nearly 2 million PF registrations compared to less than a million during the NDA-1 period. Whichever way one looks at the data, the claim that there were 30 times more “jobs” created by NDA-1 than UPA-1 is specious.

Let’s come to the next claim that high denomination notes rose to unusually high levels during UPA-1. India is a cash-dominated economy where more than 90 per cent of all consumer transactions happen in cash. So, it is natural that as economic activity increases and GDP grows robustly, demand for cash will grow commensurately as will the share of high denomination currency, unless there has been a structural change in India’s cash addiction. So, the right question to ask is: did high denomination currency grow disproportionately vis-à-vis GDP growth? The answer is no.

GDP growth and notes in circulation

The share of Rs.500 notes in circulation went from nearly 20 per cent in 1999 to 40 per cent in 2004, as GDP grew 1.4 times in this period. Similarly, the share of Rs.1,000 notes went from less than 1 per cent to nearly 10 per cent in this period. When GDP grew much more rapidly at 1.8 times between 2004 and 2009, the share of Rs.500 notes went from 40 per cent to only 45 per cent, but Rs.1,000 notes went from 10 per cent to 30 per cent. This is entirely in line with GDP growth, as a simple logarithmic growth analysis shows. High denomination notes account for about 85 per cent of all currency in circulation in India. In China, they account for 87 per cent, and even in a far more cashless society such as the U.S., the share is 80 per cent. So the claim that India’s high denomination notes is disproportionately large is baseless. Mr. Gurumurthy does not find any problems in a 10-fold increase in the share of Rs.1,000 notes and a doubling in share of Rs.500 notes during NDA-1. But he thinks a similar increase for a much higher GDP growth during UPA-1 is a sign of ‘black money roaming around fuelling fake growth’.

In essence, the story that black money induced rising asset prices which led to high GDP growth with no jobs is a phantom one, devoid of any basis. This phantom story is then used to justify an unprecedented, ill-conceived, overnight invalidation of nearly 90 per cent of a country’s currency. Dr. Singh expressed genuine concern over the demonetisation policy, its objectives, implementation and potential costs. Is there anyone in the RSS or government who can clearly articulate the intended objectives, economic impact and measurable outcomes of this demonetisation exercise?

Rajeev Gowda is a Congress member of the Rajya Sabha. He has previously been a Director on the Central Board of the Reserve Bank of India and Professor at the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore.

Courtesy: The Hindu

Bridging the learning deficit

EDITORIAL The Hindu

Bridging the learning deficit

Almost five decades after India first formulated its National Education Policy, the Ministry for Human Resource Development appears to be gearing up for another revision to this policy document, and not a moment too soon. The state of education, particularly in the critical primary and pre-primary years, is far from satisfactory. Since the early 2000s, successive governments kept up momentum on a sustained investment push into schools in a bid to resolve what was viewed as a supply-side problem. As The Hindu’s recent series on primary education, Learning Deficit, highlighted, it was hoped that through this effort children in elementary education would be provided with classrooms, uniforms, textbooks and other teaching materials, and a larger contingent of teachers. Thus, this approach hoped to tackle low enrolment rates. Led by government schools, public investment in education helped raise the gross enrolment ratio from 81.6 per cent of children in the 6-14 age group in 2000 to 96 per cent or more since 2008. Yet it soon became evident that getting children into school was only the first step, especially when gaping holes remained in the system. Among these, the barriers to high-quality, equitably-distributed primary education include: high dropout rates, especially for girls; teacher absenteeism and low teaching quality; and outmoded pedagogies and insufficient resources to implement contemporary teaching methods.

The problem of poor learning outcomes is of particular concern, for it is a structural issue pertaining to the design of curricula and ingrained rote learning methods. These have been the backbone of India’s teaching tradition for over half a century. But will this help create the kind of workforce that India wishes to develop: nimble, highly-skilled and ready for the digital age, the global economy and new pathways of occupational mobility? Or will the sheer weight of an outdated, colonial-era education system make Indians too sluggish and skill-deprived to cope in a highly competitive global arena? While efforts of the present and previous government to boost the quality of learning in higher and vocational education must be appreciated, policymakers ought not to ignore early childhood education and primary schooling, the phases during which the most important cognitive development milestones are attained. The tenth Annual Status of Education Report found that in 2014 the proportion of Class 3 and Class 5 students in rural areas who could read a Class 2 textbook was 23.6 and 48.1 per cent, respectively. Until Activity-Based Learning and “teaching at the right level”, tools for real learning and skill-absorption, become the norm, hopes of the country becoming a great power may well remain a dream.

Credit: The Hindu

The right to withdraw money cannot be extinguished by demonetisation

Illegal cap

The right to withdraw money cannot be extinguished by demonetisation.

Written by P D T Achary

The Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, Section 26(2), empowers the Centre to demonetise any series of bank notes of any denomination. But that cannot be done without the recommendation of the Central Board of the Reserve Bank constituted under this Act. Section 26(2) of the RBI Act provides for the issue of a notification in the Gazette of India specifying the date on which the two demonetisation will come into effect as well as the series and denomination(s) of bank notes to be demonetised.

On November 8, the PM informed the nation Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 notes would be demonetised with effect from that midnight. Subsequently, the department of economic affairs of the finance ministry issued a notification laying down conditions incidental to the demonetisation exercise. This notification, issued under section 26(2) of the RBI Act, 1934, has given rise to considerable consternation amongst citizens on account of the cap being imposed on the withdrawal of money from one’s own account. It is a matter unconnected with the subject matter of demonetisation dealt with in the notification and the ministry was a bit disingenuous inserting this condition in paragraph (vi) of the notification.

The notification referred to in section 26(2) of the RBI Act, 1934 is a subordinate legislation whose function is to deal with the details relating to the provisions in the parent act passed by the legislature. As a matter of practice, the legislature lays down the policy in an Act and leaves it to the government to work out the details to give effect to that policy. But the power delegated to the government is not absolute. The rules or notifications issued by the government in pursuance to a provision in an Act need to be strictly within the scope of that provision. Any such transgression by the executive will be termed as ultra vires the Act and will be struck down by the courts. The Practice and Procedure of Parliament by M.N. Kaul and S.L. Shakdher (6th Edition; p.671) notes, “In order to be valid, subordinate legislation must be intra vires the statute… As a corollary to the general rule of ultra vires the power of subordinate legislation can be exercised only in the manner laid down in the Parent Act and not in any other way.”

It would be useful to quote a couple of observations of the Supreme Court on the nature and scope of subordinate legislation. “Power to frame rules is conferred by the Act and that power may be exercised within the strict limits of the authority conferred. If in making a rule the State transcends its authority the rule will be invalid for statutory rules made in exercise of delegated authority are valid and binding only if made within the limits of authority conferred.” (State of Kerala v. K.M. Charia Adulka & Co.; 1965 SCR (I) 601). “Any rule which is shown to have been made in contravention of the provisions of the Act for any reason other than to give effect to the purposes of the Act or for any reason other than to give effect to the purposes of the Act, would be declared void by the Court on the ground that it goes beyond the scope of the power conferred on the Government”. (Shiv Kripal Singh vs V.V. Giri (1970) 2 SCC 567). It becomes clear from these observations of the SC that a subordinate legislation which goes beyond the scope of the power conferred on the government by the legislature is void and therefore is not binding.”

The legality of the condition contained in para (vi) of the notification issued by the Ministry of Finance on November 8 needs to be examined in the light of the law laid down by the apex court in respect of the subordinate legislation. This para imposed a limit on the amount one can withdraw from one’s own account, a condition clearly unrelated to the purpose and object of Section 26(2) which empowers the government to demonetise currency of any denomination. The money deposited in a bank by an individual is his personal property and the bank is keeping that money as a custodian of the account holder. He has the right to withdraw the entire money and close his account any time. That right cannot be limited or extinguished by a notification on demonetisation. Demonetisation only makes certain currency notes illegal from a particular date. It does not change the legal status of the personal accounts.

The above condition, therefore, is beyond the scope of the power conferred on the government by Section 26(2) of the Act and is hence void and not binding.

The writer is a former secretary general of the Lok Sabha.

Courtesy: Indian Express

http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/demonetisation-rbi-black-money-cash-withdrawal-4434157/

Majoritarian tendencies threaten human rights across the world.

The besieged other
Majoritarian tendencies threaten human rights across the world.

Written by John Samuel

Rohingyas community has been at the receiving end of violence by Myanmar’s security forces and the country’s dominant ethnic groups.

Human Rights are universal, indivisible and inalienable. Protection of human rights is not only a sign of democracy and development but also signifies a commitment to international conventions driven by universal principles. The normative principles of human rights, democracy, and development are three international narratives that informed the political process across the world for more than 65 years.

However, these normative principles that brought universal ethics to the political process are under unprecedented threat. The core principles of these discourses have been subverted by majoritarian, populist and authoritarian leaders, and governments, in many countries.

This month, stories of mass atrocities and rampant human rights violations have been reported from Myanmar and the Philippines. Despite the killings targetting a marginalised minority that numbers barely a million in Myanmar, there has hardly been any substantive international demand for an investigation of the atrocities against the Rohingyas. The community has been at the receiving end of violence by Myanmar’s security forces and the country’s dominant ethnic groups. Myanmar’s leaders have not spoken out against this.

A recent report in the New York Times by the well-known photo-journalist Daniel Berehulk captured the extremely tragic consequences of the “slaughter them all” call given by the populist but authoritarian president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Deterrence. The call was a part of his high-profile campaign against drugs. Those who are dealing in drugs or even using them were killed by death squads. The victims included mere suspects. Apart from thousands who were killed during police action against drug peddlers and users, it is estimated that there are 3,500 unresolved homicides in the country.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights came into being in response to a number of miseries that overtook people before the World War II. These include the Holocaust and the rampant violation of human rights by dictators. In the second half of the 20th century, despite the Cold War, the world has moved towards a stable internationalism based on the broad consensus around human rights, democracy and development. Such a framework was based on a new sense of universalism. It was based on a set of normative principles and international standards to ensure peace, development, and the dignity of human beings and communities at the national and international level.

This universal framework lifted billions of people out of slavery, colonialism and poverty. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, human rights acquired global acceptance. The UN-sponsored Vienna summit on human rights in 1993 heralded a new era for human rights, democracy and development.

However, along with the international development narratives of the past 15 years, a new security-centric discourse also emerged. This focused largely on the “mistrust” of the “other” and led to a paradigm shift in national security discourses. It generated paranoia against migrant communities and people who are “unlike” the majority. This also gave rise to a political narrative based on “defensive nationalism”. This nationalism is based on insecurity and fear, instead of freedom and rights.

After 30 years of neo-liberalism and unbridled economic globalisation, driven by big multinational corporations and rich countries, the world is now a deeply unequal and divided place. Increasing social, economic and political inequalities and insecurities are giving rise to different modes of reactionary politics. This politics is based on a new form of hyper-nationalism, mistrust and hate. In many countries, the economic elites and political elites have captured the state by subverting the electoral democratic system and civic rights. Hence, there is an urgent need to forge movements of civil society and citizens within countries, and at the international level, to reclaim the substantive universal principles of human rights, democracy and development.

The writer is executive director of FORUM-ASIA, Asian forum for Human Rights and Development.

Credit: Indian Express

Private higher education is burgeoning in India – but millions can't afford it

Private higher education is burgeoning in India – but millions can't afford it

About 44.81 million students aged between 18 and 24 in India do not have the money for further education, a study shows.

As many as 44.81 million – 16.6% male and 9.5% female – Indian undergraduate students aged between 18 and 24 are too poor to pursue higher education, according to data from the National Sample Survey, 2014.

Source: National Sample Survey report, 2014; figures in percentage

As many as 34.2 million students were enrolled in institutions of higher education in 2014-15, according to the 2016 All India Survey on Higher Education report of the ministry of human resources and development.

Nearly 22 million students (65%) are enrolled in private institutions in various courses.

Source: * 12th Five Year Plan , # All India Survey on Higher Education 2014-15 report ; figures in percentage

Private sector accounts for more than 76% of total institutions of higher education, data from the All India Survey on Higher Education 2014-15 report shows.

There are 712 central and state universities, 36,671 colleges and about 11,445 standalone diploma-level institutions across the country.

While government-owned institutions for higher education increased from 11,239 in 2006-07 to 16,768 in 2011-12 (49%), private sector institutions recorded a 63% growth in the same period from 29,384 in 2006-07 to 46,430 in 2011-12, according to the 12th five-year plan document of the erstwhile Planning Commission.

The first decade of the 21st century witnessed expansion of higher educational institutions, according to this mission document of the National Higher Education Mission (known as Rashtriya Uchchatar Shiksha Abhiyan or RUSA), a programme run by the University Grants Commission.

Forced to enroll in private institutions

Around 53% college students are enrolled in private institutions because there are not enough public higher educational institutions, according to the 2014 NSS report we previously quoted.

Source: National Sample Survey Report, 2014; figures in percentage

Students have also been drawn to short-term diploma and certificate courses because of their employability prospect. Secondly, there is huge shortage of public institutions offering such courses, data shows.

Nearly 64% students enrolled for diploma and certificate courses in private institutions would rather be in government-run institutions, according to the NSS report.

So, while there is high demand for public higher educational institutions, successive governments have failed to meet the demand, pushing students towards expensive and, very often, low quality private education.

Commodification of education and exclusion

Private (out-of-pocket) expenditure on education for general courses has increased from Rs 2,461 per student in 2007-08 to Rs 6,788 per student in 2014 (175.8% increase), according to the two NSS reports on education published in 2007-08 and 2014.

Source: National Sample Survey report, 2014

The TSR Subramanian Committee report on New Education Policy, submitted in 2016, admitted that uncontrolled privatisation of higher education has resulted in the proliferation of private institutions for higher education.

Most of these institutions are nothing more than shops selling degrees, according to the report. “While there are a few (institutions) which can be identified as ‘Centres of Excellence’, both in the public and private sectors, there are a large number which are mediocre, some of them could well be described as ‘degree shops’.”

Fees at private institutions are more than double those charged by government institutions, according to the NSS report.

Private institutions keep the cost of education high, despite restrictions on generating profit.

Ernst and Young, a global auditing and consulting agency, estimated that the market of Indian higher education is worth around Rs 46,000 crore and is expanding by 18% annually, Mint reported on September 10, 2013.

Source: National Sample Survey report, 2014

The private sector accounts for around 74% of enrolment in technical and professional courses because it has market demand, according to the NSS report. Yet, it shares only 39% of enrolment in general under-graduate and postgraduate courses.

Hurdles in increasing enrolment

Low gross enrolment ratio (GER or percentage of potential students enrolled in educational institutions in a given year) in higher education has been a concern in India compared to other emerging economies in the world.

The GER of higher education has increased from 10% in 2004 to 23.6% in 2014, according to human resources ministry data. Despite the increase, India’s GER (23.6%) is the lowest among major emerging economies such as Brazil (46%), China (30%), Russia (78%) and South Africa (20%), according to World Bank data.

This GER in higher education is less compared to the number of students completing their school education (higher secondary) in the age group of 14-17 years. The GER of students in the age group 16-17 year was 49.1% in 2014, according to human resources ministry data.

So, more than half the students aged between 16 and 17 years did not enroll for higher education after completing schooling.

Successive governments have argued that allowing private sector in higher education would lead to higher enrolment. It was with this objective that both state and centre governments allowed expansion of private educational institutions in the last 10 years.

While it is true that GER in higher education has recorded growth during this period, the increased cost of higher education due to privatisation has deprived millions of aspirants from education.

High level of GER in higher education has direct co-relation with public financing, according to the mission document of RUSA.

Higher per capita expenditure on higher education in some states has resulted in better GER. For example, the per capita expenditure of Goa is Rs. 14,634 and the GER is 33.2%. Similarly, the GER of Tripura is 32.9% with Rs 13,104 per capita expenses. The GER of Andhra Pradesh is 28.4% with per capita expenditure Rs 5,892, according the mission document of RUSA.

Global experience also suggests that higher public investment in education yields positive results, according to the mission document of RUSA.

This article first appeared on Indiaspend, a data-driven and public-interest journalism non-profit.

We welcome your comments at letters@scroll.in.

Credit. Scroll.in

Demonetisation has affected people’s ability to access health facilities.

Cash and care

Demonetisation has affected people’s ability to access health facilities.

Written by Shah Alam Khan

More than a month after the government announced its demonetisation drive, the country has begun to realise its social, economic and political implications. As we know, the move has affected processes and practices that require cash transactions throughout the country. It will take some time for the full impact of the demonetisation process to manifest but its short-term implications are already visible. These need careful evaluation. One doesn’t need rocket science to understand that one area where cash crunch has affected the common people, directly, is access to healthcare.

Working in the country’s largest public health hospital, I have realised that demonetisation has hit healthcare access in a significant way. There have been requests to postpone surgeries, patients have dropped out from follow-up clinics and a significant number of appointments have been canceled. The AIIMS’s orthopedic out patient department (OPD) saw a 22 per cent dip in patients in November (between November 11 and December 2) as compared to October 2016 (between October 4 and October 30). National festivals, inclement weather and school holidays usually cause a dip in patient attendance at the AIIMS but none of these reasons were at work during this period.

In India’s three-tier healthcare delivery system, people have to travel to access healthcare. A significant number of patients who consult doctors at the AIIMs are from outside Delhi. Demonetisation has badly hit people’s capacity to move out of their hometowns to seek health advice even though public funding systems are, to a significant extent, taking care of the costs of medicines, surgery, and implants.

The Indian Council on Competitiveness’ roundtable on healthcare has identified a financial barrier as the toughest obstacle in the way of common people accessing healthcare. Demonetisation and lack of funds have, unfortunately, aggravated matters. The corridors of hospitals like the AIIMS are full of stories on credit spending, particularly by people facing dire situations, including those suffering from diseases such as cancer. A large number of patients say the fund crunch has forced them to take credits. This aggravates poverty caused by healthcare expenditure.

At the AIIMS, there is little or no demand on the patient’s pocket. Even then, there has been a significant reduction in patient numbers. We can imagine what the cash crunch has done to patients seeking private healthcare. In a country where the private sector delivers around 70 per cent of healthcare, the situation arising out of demonetisation can be anybody’s guess.

My friends who work in private medical institutions relate similar experiences: Patient attendance has gone down, surgeries are being postponed and people are resorting to credit. So even when the full impact of demonetisation is yet to unfurl, common people appear to be cutting down on healthcare costs. This is a serious challenge and needs active government intervention. It is difficult for the medical fraternity to give a clear solution because the problem lies in bringing the patient to the hospital and not initiating actual treatment. And this problem stems from the absence of cash in hand.

A robust government health insurance policy (with a home to hospital coverage) would have gone a long way in mitigating this situation. Measures like provision of cash at hospital kiosks and registration counters, free transport services for patients and educating the masses to avoid cost-cutting on healthcare could have prevented people from (forcefully) opting out of medical treatment.

We are told to be patient (and rightly so) during this process of massive transformation of the Indian economy. Unfortunately, however, preaching patience to the ill, disabled and the dying can be tricky. Yes, we need to cleanse the system but that should not be at the cost of the poor who are dependent on cash for essential needs like healthcare. Doing so is unethical and dangerous.

The writer is professor of orthopaedics, AIIMS, New Delhi. Views are personal.

Courtesy: Indian Express

Warring Muslim groups in Kerala have joined forces to fight the government on Uniform Civil Code

Warring Muslim groups in Kerala have joined forces to fight the government on Uniform Civil Code

Brought together by the Indian Union Muslim League, Sunni, Salafist and Jamaat leaders met recently to discuss strategy.

Image credit:  REUTERS / Shailesh Andrade

The government’s revival of the debate on a Uniform Civil Code – a common set of laws governing marriage, divorce, succession and adoption that would replace various religious personal laws – has united warring Muslim religious organisations in Kerala.

Setting aside their ideological differences, at least for now, these groups have joined forces to defeat the Centre. The unity call – engineered by the political party, the Indian Union Muslim League – has even led to the merger of two rival Salafist factions that had parted ways 14 years ago.

The catalyst for the unlikely reunion was the National Law Commission’s questionnaire in October seeking public opinion on a Uniform Civil Code. The questionnaire tied in with the government’s affidavit in Supreme Court, filed the same month, seeking a ban on the Muslim practice of triple talaq, saying it “cannot be regarded as an essential or integral part of the religion”.

Muslims organisations, including the All India Muslim Personal Law Board, had vehemently opposed both actions then.

In November, the Kerala groups – including one Sunni faction, three Salafist outfits and the Jamaat-e-Islami – met in Kozhikode and resolved to boycott the questionnaire. They also decided to conduct a signature campaign against the government’s proposed move to bring in a Uniform Civil Code. “Lakhs of people participated in the campaign held in mosques in the first week of November,” said Indian Union Muslim League national secretary ET Mohammed Basheer.

Factions and rivalries

All five organisations that were part of the meeting in Kozhikode espouse divergent views on a host of theological matters, including some details of prayers.

The numerically strong Sunnis owe allegiance to two rival groups led by the late EK Aboobacker Musliyar and AP Aboobacker Musliyar, which are popularly known as the EK and AP factions, respectively. Both groups, in turn, oppose the ideologies of the Salafists and the Jamaat-e-Islami.

Factional feuds have wreaked havoc in the Salafist camp too. The parent outfit, the Kerala Nadvathul Mujahideen, suffered a vertical split in 2002, resulting in the formation of the TP Abdulla Koya Madani faction and the Hussain Madavoor faction. A third Salafist group, Wisdom Global Islamic Mission, is a more recent addition.

These rivalries have often resulted in violent confrontations – between rival Sunni factions and between Sunnis and Salafists – with many people losing their lives in the process.

A common cause

However, all of them have agreed to bury the hatchet, at least for the time being, to fight a common enemy.

“The Centre will listen to our demands only if we stand united,” said Professor Alikkutty Musliar, Islamic scholar and general secretary of the EK Sunni faction. “We will not allow the government to change Islamic Shariah.”

The biggest unification, perhaps, has been that of the Salafist factions, the TP Abdulla Koya Madani and Hussain Madavoor groups. They had so far resisted all attempts at a patch-up, including several made by the Indian Union Muslim League.

On December 6, in Kozhikode, Madani said the challenges facing the Muslim community at the moment, including the Uniform Civil Code, had acted as a catalyst for the merger. “Of course, the Centre’s plan to implement the Uniform Civil Code was a major cause for concern for all Muslims in India,” he said. “We will stand united in our fight against Uniform Civil Code.”

The Indian Union Muslim League’s ET Mohammed Basheer said only his party could have united the Muslim organisations. “The party was in the forefront of the agitation after the Supreme Court verdict in the Shah Bano case in 1985, which forced the government to enact the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act,” he said. “We will resume protests if the Narendra Modi government insists on implementing a Uniform Civil Code.”

The Shah Bano verdict was a landmark case in which the court had ruled in favour of alimony for the 62-year-old divorced mother of five. However, under pressure from Muslim organisations, the Rajiv Gandhi-led Congress government had enacted the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which sought to restrict maintenance to Muslim women to a period of just three months after divorce.

Praising the Indian Union Muslim League for bringing together rival Muslim groups, CP Saleem, convenor of Wisdom Global Islamic Mission, said it was the late GM Banatwala, an MP of the party, who had presented a bill against the Shah Bano verdict in the Lok Sabha way back in 1985.

Problems persist

However, the reunion has not been smooth. In a setback for the Indian Union Muslim League, Kanthapuram AP Aboobacker Musliyar, leader of the AP Sunni faction, did not attend the meeting in November. Party leader Basheer said he did not know the reason for Musliyar’s no-show, saying, “We had invited him for the meeting.”

It is believed that the reason for Musliyar’s absence was his reluctance to share a platform with Salafist and Jamaat leaders.

Soon after the meeting, Mujeeb Rahman Kinaloor, editor of Varthamanam, a newspaper owned by the Hussain Madavoor faction of the Salafists, wrote that Musliyar had sowed the seeds of the Sunni split in 1985 after some Sunni leaders had shared a dais with Salafist and Jamaat leaders. “Leaders of all Muslim organisations in Kerala had participated in a meeting when AIMPLB [All India Muslim Personal Law Board] leaders Abdul Hassan Ali Nadvi and Mujahidul Islam visited Kozhikode after the Shah Bano verdict in 1985,” he wrote. “However, Kanthapuram AP Aboobacker Musliyar criticised the Samastha Kerala Jamiyyathul Ulema’s decision to share the dais with Salafist and Jamaat-e-Islami leaders. The rebellion resulted in Musliyar’s expulsion from the organisation.”

Though missing at the meeting, Musliyar later spoke at a public function of his support for the joint agitation against the government. “Uniform Civil Code would destroy the peaceful atmosphere in the country, where people belonging to different religions live amicably,” he said. “I hope that the prime minister will not take any step that might hurt religious sentiments.”

Reinforcing the view that bad blood between the groups will not be erased merely by the joining of forces to fight the government on Uniform Civil Code, CP Saleem of Wisdom Global Islamic Mission said, “We have ideological differences with the Jamaat-e-Islami and we will not participate if they call for a meeting.” He added, “The same will happen if we invite them for a meeting.” He said that in such a scenario, the Indian Union Muslim League was the only one that could keep the Muslim religious organisations united.

“Sunni and Salafi outfits have ideological differences on many issues, including triple talaq,” he added. “But no one raised those issues at the meeting, keeping in mind the larger interests of Muslim society.”

However, even as the Indian Union Muslim League draws praise for uniting the various groups, it is also facing flak on social media for keeping its women’s wing, the Vanitha League, out of the meeting in November.

Noorbina Rasheed, general secretary of the Vanitha League as well as an advocate and a member of the State Women’s Commission, however, dismissed the criticism. “I am happy as the IUML has succeeded in bringing the leaders of various outfits together to chalk out strategy in the fight against Uniform Civil Code,” she said. “That is a big achievement. Women’s participation is not a must in these kinds of meetings.”

Credit: Scroll.in